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decade, from first attempts to regulate net neutrality to the implementation of regulation 
in 2019. Based on a qualitative content analysis, the study assesses the arguments 
employed by various policy-making actors to advocate or prevent particular governance 
solutions. Results of the empirical analysis show that early attempts to regulate net 
neutrality failed, but discussions about its handling were continued during the revision of 
the Telecommunications Act. Though the government was ultimately in favor of including 
only transparency requirements in law, parliament stood up to government and industry 
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Since its first mention in research in the early 2000s (Wu, 2003; Yoo, 2004), net neutrality has 
become a policy priority, accompanied by enormous and—for a communications policy issue—almost 
unprecedented public attention. Research on net neutrality has thus far focused mostly on economic and 
legal aspects as well as on developments in the U.S. and the EU, while smaller countries’ policies and policy-
making processes have received scant attention. Similarly, research indicates that debates have mostly 
revolved around the affirmation or negation of statutory regulation without responding much to calls for 
evidence-based policymaking (Renda, 2015) or considering the viability of alternative governance options 
(Latzer, Just, Saurwein, & Slominski, 2003; Latzer, Saurwein, & Just, 2019; Puppis, 2010). 
 
This article investigates the net neutrality policy-making process in a small country—Switzerland. 
It sketches a decade of net neutrality policymaking, from first parliamentary attempts at regulation to the 
most recent revision of the Telecommunications Act (TCA), and explores the arguments employed by the 
actors involved in policymaking to advocate or prevent particular regulatory solutions. The study uses a 
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policy-cycle framework, which distinguishes distinct stages of political decision making, and is based on a 
qualitative content analysis. 
 
This article first revisits the contested meaning of net neutrality and its transformation, the policy 
objectives pursued with it, and research about net neutrality debates and policy-making processes. 
Embedded in a discussion of the policy-cycle model and institutional influences on policy outcomes, it then 
describes the various peculiarities of the Swiss decision-making process and discusses the research 
questions and the methods of data collection and analysis. This is followed by detailed results of the empirical 
analysis and a conclusion. 
 
The Net Neutrality Principle 
 
From Technical and Pricing Issues to Requisite Means for a Plethora of Ends 
 
During its rise to fame, the meaning of net neutrality underwent a tremendous metamorphosis. 
Although there is no agreed-on definition, the term generally refers to a principle that all Internet traffic 
should be treated equally (i.e., should not be blocked, prioritized, or throttled, regardless of content, 
application, source, or destination). Most of today’s reasoning about the indispensability of net neutrality 
rests on the idea of the original application-blind, layered, end-to-end Internet architecture (van Schewick, 
2016), alongside the best effort principle and the traditional bill-and-keep system. Various scholars have 
cautioned that this reference to an allegedly neutral network is misguided because the Internet at large has 
not been neutral for a long time (e.g., Renda, 2008; Yoo, 2013). For example, the theoretical possibility of 
prioritizing data packets and employing quality-of-service management techniques existed long before this 
debate surfaced (Krämer, Wiewiorra, & Weinhardt, 2013). Furthermore, although the general understanding 
of net neutrality is very broad, in a strict sense it refers to network management practices that apply to the 
last-mile Internet service provider (ISP) with a focus on the downloading of content, meaning that any 
network management practice that occurs outside the last mile would not be considered a violation of net 
neutrality. Similarly, agreements that guarantee packet precedence by content delivery networks or paid-
peering agreements would basically be outside of net neutrality regulation, too (Easley, Guo, & Krämer, 
2018). Moreover, the Internet is full of agreements that are governed by private contracts and market 
forces—a position that is rarely reflected in policy debates. 
 
Altogether, net neutrality has evolved from an originally technical and pricing issue at the 
infrastructure level, with innovation and competition inhibiting consequences and a focus on ISPs as 
potential last-mile gatekeepers and their relationship to content/application service providers (CAPs), to an 
almost catch-all policy term and regulatory remedy for all sorts of Internet problems. As such, while 
considered an end in itself, net neutrality now assumes the role of a requisite means for various other ends, 
ranging from innovation (e.g., Bauer & Knieps, 2018; Latzer, 2013; Neute, 2016; Schultze & Whitt, 2016; 
van Schewick, 2010), traffic management and infrastructure development (e.g., Dischinger et al., 2010; 
Faulhaber, 2011; Krämer et al., 2013; Maltinsky, Giladi, & Shavitt, 2017; van Schewick, 2015), competition 
and abusive practices (e.g., Baake & Sudaric, 2018; Faulhaber, 2011; Renda, 2015), public-sphere 
considerations (Löblich & Musiani, 2014), and questions of diversity and freedom of expression (Audibert & 
Murray, 2016; Renda, 2015; Sluijs, 2012). This then makes net neutrality a topic that inevitably requires 
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reconciling political and economic goals (Bauer & Obar, 2014). Though conclusions on the impact of net 
neutrality regulation are theoretically contested and, because of scarce research, empirically an open 
question, these objectives are repeatedly invoked in the debates. 
 
Evidently, the originally rather narrow scope of net neutrality has been expanded, and it now 
stands almost as a guarantor for an overall “open Internet”—a term also more preferably employed in 
policy debates and law. Kimball (2013) investigates the history of the term in the U.S. and explains how 
it has been translated by various stakeholders and has absorbed their values and interests through 
processes of discursive construction. Altogether, this expansion of the meaning increasingly comprises 
the different layers of the Internet, and correspondingly also issues of content, service, device, or platform 
neutrality (e.g., Krämer et al., 2013; Pasquale, 2016; Renda, 2015)—all issues essentially outside the 
scope of strict net neutrality. Although it is questionable whether net neutrality can do justice to this 
plethora of goals or remedy any of them, these arguments constitute the background against which net 
neutrality regulation is being developed and discussed—as will also be shown in the empirical analysis of 
the Swiss policy-making process. 
 
Research on Net Neutrality Debates and Policy-Making Processes 
 
Net neutrality has become a prominent communications policy topic and has triggered substantial 
public debate. Although the bulk of research focuses on legal, economic, and technical aspects, fewer studies 
have explored various aspects of these debates. Even less work has been devoted to systematic inquiries 
into the various stages of actual net neutrality policy-making processes. 
 
The question of who influences net neutrality debates has been a key concern. Kim, Chung, and 
Kim (2011) examined who informed the net neutrality debate through the mainstream media as well as 
through congressional and FCC hearings. Lee, Sang, and Xu (2015) followed suit with a study on information 
subsidizers on Twitter. Often, the focus is on Internet activism, including the identification of stakeholders 
involved in online debates and the question of what impact networked mobilization and communication has 
on the net neutrality issue. Accordingly, Herman and Kim (2014) identified the central websites in the 
debate, and Faris, Roberts, Etling, Othman, and Benkler (2016) examined the online net neutrality debate 
in the U.S. 
 
Some have focused more on differences in stakeholders’ positions. Ly, MacDonald, and Toze 
(2012) interviewed stakeholders in Canada and concluded that there are fewer disagreements among 
stakeholders than are often depicted in the literature. Löblich’s (2016) study on civil advocacy groups 
and activist organizations in the U.S. explains differences in stakeholder positions on the grounds of race, 
class, trust, and space. Similarly, Cheng, Fleischmann, Wang, Ishita, and Oard (2012) approached 
differences in stakeholders’ positions by examining the value differences among them. The extent to 
which there are differences among national discourses were tackled by Gerlach (2016), Powell and Cooper 
(2011), and Shin (2014). 
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Other work focuses on discursive practices (Kimball, 2013, 2016; Lentz, 2013), the impact of policy 
metaphors on attitudes toward net neutrality regulation (Hartman, 2012), or media framing (Stiegler & 
Sprumont, 2013). 
 
Various studies examine the histories or approaches of net neutrality regulation and partly also 
include details on relevant actors in the decision-making process (e.g., chapters in Belli & De Filippi, 2016; 
Friedlander, 2016; Gerlach, 2016; Marsden, 2016, 2017). 
 
Fewer studies are explicitly devoted to the examination of the actual policy-making process. Hart 
(2011) describes the U.S. net neutrality debate from 2006 to 2010 and explains the politics behind it, 
showing a strong relationship between the debate and partisan politics. Cherry (2007) focuses on the stage 
of agenda setting and strategies of agenda-denial by opponents of net neutrality regulation. Milosavljević, 
Poler, and Kerševan Smokvina (2019) provide an in-depth analysis of Slovenia’s net neutrality policy from 
2010 to 2018. 
 
Altogether, this literature review indicates that studies mostly focus on particular aspects of who is 
involved in debates and the different positions these stakeholders have, while work that explicitly 
investigates the formal policy-making process and the arguments of actors involved is less common. 
Furthermore, many studies are concerned with the U.S., and there is less work on smaller jurisdictions. This 
article contributes to closing these gaps by systematically investigating the policy-making process and the 
influence and interests of actors in the political process that eventually led to net neutrality regulation in a 
small country. 
 
Analyzing the Policy-Making Process 
 
The Policy-Making Process in Switzerland 
 
The stage-based approach to decision making, inspired by the policy cycle, is an influential 
framework for understanding policy processes (Anderson, 1975; Lasswell, 1956; Windhoff-Héritier, 1987). 
It divides the complex policy process into a series of discrete stages, often labeled problem definition, 
agenda setting, policy formulation, policy implementation, and policy evaluation. This approach has 
limitations, most importantly, its sequential analysis of the policy process and its mostly descriptive nature 
(Sabatier, 2008). Nevertheless, it offers a valuable heuristic and its application in research has produced 
important insights into the complex preconditions, central influencing factors, and varied outcomes of policy 
processes (Jann & Wegrich, 2007). It is helpful, among other things, for identifying the actors involved and 
the arguments they employ in the different stages of policymaking. 
 
Actors’ opportunities to influence policymaking along these stages and the resulting policy 
outcomes vary among political systems. Historical institutionalism with its emphasis on path dependency 
(Bannerman & Haggart, 2015; Hall & Taylor, 1996; Jann & Wegrich, 2007) is particularly helpful to 
understand how institutional rules establish distinct logics of decision making that shape both government 
action and interest-group influence (Immergut, 1992). 
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The Swiss political system features various institutional characteristics that have distinct effects on 
policymaking. The existence of a grand-coalition government, bicameralism, federalism, and direct-
democratic elements—such as the popular initiative, which provides a possibility to put an issue on the 
political agenda, sidestepping government and parliament, and the optional referendum, which can be called 
by those opposing a bill adopted by parliament—result in power sharing and consensual decision making 
(Immergut, 1992; Papadopoulos, 2001). Hence, Switzerland is considered a “consociational” or “consensus 
democracy” (Lehmbruch, 1993; Lijphart, 1989, 1999). The prospect of a referendum is an important veto 
point, as it allows for overriding parliamentary decisions. Consequently, it affects the whole stage of policy 
formulation, which is usually divided into three distinct phases (Sciarini, 2007). 
 
• The option of a referendum leads to a sophisticated preparliamentary phase. A public 
consultation takes place for every draft bill the Federal Council (government) 
proposes, and all interested actors can submit a written response. The desire to make 
legislative proposals referendum-proof strengthens the influence of interest groups, 
which in turn favors incremental change and a pro-status-quo bias (Immergut, 1992; 
Papadopoulos, 2001, 2008). 
 
• Based on the feedback gathered during the preparliamentary phase, the government 
and the federal administration prepare a second draft of the bill, which is then 
introduced to parliament. In the subsequent parliamentary phase, the responsible 
select committees and plenaries of both chambers of parliament discuss the bill. 
 
• After parliament’s final vote on a bill, citizens and organizations opposing the bill can 
call for a referendum. If no referendum is called or it is rejected, the bill is adopted 
and enters into force. 
 
Besides the desire to make a bill referendum-proof, the traditional reliance on private-sector 
solutions and the strong ties of the dominating conservative parties to business interests (Mach & 
Trampusch, 2011) make the Swiss political system less prone to regulatory intervention. 
 
Research Questions and Methods 
 
The current TCA does not contain specific net neutrality regulations. It only lays down that 
government “may require providers of telecommunications services to publish information concerning the 
quality of telecommunications services provided by them,” which could also include information about the 
treatment of Internet data (Art. 12a [2], Telecommunications Act 1997, as amended). Only since the early 
2010s has net neutrality attracted more attention in policymaking, and it was one of the topics discussed 
during the most recent revision of the TCA, adopted in 2019. 
 
This article investigates the different stages of the Swiss net neutrality policy-making process from 
problem definition to adoption of the revised TCA. In particular, it addresses the following research questions: 
 
RQ1: Which actors participated in the policy-making process? 
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RQ2: What arguments did they employ to advocate or prevent particular regulatory solutions, and what 
was the result of this process? 
 
The institutional peculiarities of the political decision-making process in Switzerland, its general 
reluctance toward regulatory intervention, and the traditional reliance on private-sector solutions to 
regulatory problems provide indications that government and parliament will abstain from introducing net 
neutrality regulation. As the results will show, things played out quite differently. 
 
To analyze the arguments of the various actors involved in the policy-making process, this study 
uses a qualitative content analysis of documents. First, all the documents relating to the Swiss TCA revision 
and attendant policy-making process that were available from the federal chancellery, the federal 
administration, and parliamentary services were collected. These included official documents such as 
government reports, TCA drafts, parliamentary motions and postulates, press releases, minutes of plenary 
debates in parliament, and 151 comments filed during the public consultation of the TCA draft. These 
documents were screened to regarding the information they contained about net neutrality. Altogether, net 
neutrality was only one of many topics—such as roaming or access to the last mile—in the TCA revision, 
and some documents mention it only briefly. For example, of the 151 actors that submitted a statement 
during the consultation, only 71 at least mentioned net neutrality. A rough appraisal of the word count of 
the parliamentary debates in the National Council and the Council of States indicates that only 6% to 8% of 
them concerned net neutrality. Only documents that discussed net neutrality were eventually incorporated 
and subjected to source criticism before analysis (Karppinen & Moe, 2019; Reh, 1995; Scott, 1990). 
 
Next, the documents were analyzed by applying qualitative content analysis. While originating in 
the U.S. (Kracauer, 1952), until recently the method was most popular in German-speaking countries 
(Kuckartz, 2014; Mayring, 2015). More recently, there has been an uptake internationally (Julien, 2008; 
Puppis, 2019; Schreier, 2014) due to the method’s systematic rule-based approach, its usefulness for 
reducing text material, and its suitability for both deductive and inductive coding. In this study, the 
documents were inductively coded with MAXQDA to reveal the arguments employed by the various actors 
involved in policymaking to advocate or avoid specific governance options and regulatory solutions about 
net neutrality in the different stages of the policy-making process. These codes were consistently applied to 
the entire corpus and related to arguments for and against transparency requirements, a regulation of net 
neutrality, and exemptions from regulation for specialized services. For each category, coded segments 
were then thematically compared before connecting the categories to each other. 
 
Results 
 
This section discusses the results of the Swiss net neutrality policy-making process (see Figure 1 
for an overview). 
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Figure 1. The Swiss policy-making process and the case of net neutrality. 
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Problem Definition 
 
When the Swiss government first looked into the need to revise the TCA in the early 2010s, net 
neutrality was not yet considered a major issue. In 2010, because of a postulate adopted by the Council of 
States (the upper chamber of parliament), the government prepared a first report to evaluate the 
development of the telecommunications market and the need to revise the TCA. Among many other issues, 
the report discussed net neutrality and the opportunities and risks of its regulation (see Table 1).  
 
Table 1. Arguments For and Against Regulation Considered by Government. 
Arguments  
Against regulation Restricts economic freedom and revenues sources of TSPs 
 No incentive for investment in infrastructure 
 Prevents necessary traffic management 
 No need for regulation, as there is no market failure 
For regulation Discrimination against third-party services 
 Impediment to innovation and market entry 
 Market failure and abuse by TSPs 
 Consumer protection 
 Media diversity 
 Freedom of information and expression 
Note. Documents analyzed: Federal Council (2010, 2012). 
 
The government eventually held that it was too soon to revise a law that had entered into force only in 2007 
(Federal Council, 2010). After the respective select committees in both chambers of parliament discussed 
the report, they asked the government to prepare an updated report on the development of the 
telecommunications markets, which was published in 2012. The arguments for and against a regulation of 
net neutrality remained basically unchanged, and the government still did not feel that the time had come 
to revise the TCA. However, it promised to start working on a revision of the law before the end of the 
parliamentary term in fall 2015 (Federal Council, 2012). 
 
As part of the government’s preparatory work for a TCA revision, it created a Net Neutrality Working 
Group and invited representatives of the telecommunications industry, users, consumer-protection 
organizations, and public broadcasting to participate. The aim of the working group was to provide an 
overview of net neutrality to provide essential information for the revision of the law (see Table 2). The 
group published its report in fall 2014 (BAKOM, 2014). 
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Table 2. Arguments For and Against Regulation Considered by the Net Neutrality Working Group. 
Arguments  
Against regulation Restricts economic freedom of TSPs 
 Impediment to innovation 
 Prevents necessary traffic management 
 Implementation problems 
 No need for regulation as there is no market failure 
For regulation Discrimination against third-party services 
 Impediment to innovation and market entry 
 Market failure and abuse by TSPs 
 Incentive for investment in infrastructure 
 Competition law not sufficient 
 Traffic management remains possible 
 Consumer protection 
 Internet as a basic infrastructure for society 
 Media diversity 
 Freedom of information and expression 
Note. Document analyzed: BAKOM (2014). 
 
Agenda Setting 
 
Unimpressed by the government’s wait-and-see approach, MPs unsuccessfully tried to put net 
neutrality on the agenda themselves. In a motion on the legal stipulation of net neutrality submitted to 
the National Council (the lower chamber), the government was asked to enshrine net neutrality into law 
in the upcoming TCA revision. The MPs argued that net neutrality was necessary to protect freedom of 
information and expression, consumers and innovation, and to prevent discrimination against online 
services by third parties. The government considered the motion premature (see Table 3). Nevertheless, 
the National Council adopted it by a clear majority of 118 to 61, with 18 abstentions (Motion 12.4212, 
2012; Official Bulletin of the National Council AB N, 2014, pp. 1134–1135; for a list of actors, see Table 
A1 in the Appendix). 
 
Before the motion was discussed in the Council of States, two related developments took place. 
First, in late 2014, the telecommunications industry introduced a self-regulatory code and arbitration board 
on net neutrality to guarantee transparency for end users. The industry thus committed itself to safeguarding 
freedom of information and to refrain from blocking applications and services. Net neutrality as such, 
however, is not guaranteed by this self-regulation (“Code of Conduct Net Neutrality,” 2017). Second, the 
government moved forward with the promised TCA revision. In its third report on the development of the 
Swiss telecommunications market, it announced a revision of the law that would also contain transparency 
requirements for (tele-)communications service providers with respect to net neutrality, but it refrained 
from stricter regulation, arguing that there are technical and economic reasons for preferential treatment of 
services (Federal Council, 2014). 
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When the motion to enshrine net neutrality in law was eventually discussed by the Council of 
States, it was rejected. The majority of MPs argued that the newly introduced self-regulation and the 
transparency requirements proposed by the government were sufficient. Stricter regulation was deemed 
unnecessary given that there was no evidence of market failure, and it was believed it would stifle innovation 
(Official Bulletin of the Council of States AB S, 2015, pp. 195–198; see Table 3). 
 
Table 3. Arguments For and Against Regulation Considered 
in Parliamentary Debates on Motion 12.4212. 
Arguments  Actors 
Against regulation Wait and see Bieri/CVP, Federal Council 
 Transparency obligation is 
sufficient 
TTC-S, Federal Council 
 Self-regulation is sufficient TTC-S, Federal Council 
 Reverse discrimination TTC-S, Federal Council 
 Impediment to innovation TTC-S, Federal Council 
 No need for regulation, as there 
is no market failure 
TTC-S 
For regulation Discrimination against third-
party services 
Motion 12.4212 
 Impediment to innovation and 
market entry 
Motion 12.4212; Glättli/GP; 
Janiak/SP; Stadler/GLP; 
Recordon/GP 
 Market failure and abuse by 
TSPs 
Recordon/GP 
 Traffic management remains 
possible 
Motion 12.4212 
 Consumer protection Motion 12.4212; Glättli/GP; 
Janiak/SP, Stadler/GLP 
 The Internet as a basic 
infrastructure for society 
Glättli/GP 
 Media diversity Janiak/SP 
 Freedom of information and 
expression 
Motion 12.4212; Glättli/GP; 
TTC-S Minority; Janiak/SP; 
Recordon/GP 
Note. Documents analyzed: Official Bulletin of the National Council AB N (2014); Official Bulletin of the 
Council of States AB S (2015); Motion 12.4212, 2012. 
 
Preparliamentary Phase of Policy Formulation 
 
Consistent with the announced course of action, the government’s predraft of the new TCA 
published in late 2015 contained a requirement for (tele-)communications service providers to inform 
end users about any discrimination of content transmission (Telecommunications Act Pre-Draft 2015, 
authors’ translation): 
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Article 12a “Information on telecommunications services” 
(2) If they [the providers of telecommunications services] treat information technically or 
economically differently during transmission, they have to inform about it publicly. 
(3) They inform publicly about the quality of telecommunications services offered. 
 
The government argued that this transparency obligation helps in strengthening the consumers’ 
sovereignty as well as consumer protection, allows for innovation, and keeps costs for TSPs low (UVEK, 
2015). At this time, the U.S., the EU, and other countries had already adopted net neutrality provisions 
(e.g., Gerlach, 2016; Marsden, 2017). Nevertheless, the Swiss government did not see a need for regulation. 
 
The subsequent public consultation on this predraft showed that opinions among parties, 
associations, corporations, and NGOs about net neutrality were sharply divided (UVEK, 2016; written 
statements by various actors—see Table 4 and Table A1 for an overview of involved actors). Of the 71 
statements that touched on net neutrality, several were (nearly) identical, pointing to a concerted action of 
different coalitions (see Table A2 in the Appendix). 
 
Table 4. Actors Participating in the Public Consultation. 
Category Actors 
Political parties BDP, CVP, FDP, GLP, GP, PP, SP, SVP 
Federal bodies Federal Media Commission, Price Regulator 
Umbrella organizations Economiesuisse, ICT Switzerland, SGB, SGV 
Trade associations telecommunications: asut, Glasfasernetz Schweiz, openaxs, 
Suissedigital 
Broadcasting: RRR, TeleSuisse, VSP 
Companies Telecommunications: Quickline, Salt, Sunrise, Swisscom, UPC, 
VTX 
Broadcasting: 3+, AZ Medien, SRG 
IT: Microsoft 
Consumer protection organizations ASCI, FRC, kf, SKS 
NGOs /ch/open, Digitale Gesellschaft, ISCO-CH, WikimediaCH 
 
There was disagreement about whether the proposed transparency obligation was necessary at 
all (see Table 5). The federation of industries (Economiesuisse), the association of small and medium-
sized businesses (SGV), the trade associations of telecommunications service providers (asut), fiber-
optic networks (Glasfasernetz Schweiz), and cable networks (Suissedigital—and 20 identical statements 
by some of its members), as well as the big telecommunications companies (the incumbent Swisscom, 
UPC, and Salt) were opposed to the proposed requirement. They argued that self-regulation was 
sufficient and that there was no evidence of market failure that would require additional regulation. This 
coalition was supported by center-right parties (BDP, CVP) and a conservative consumer protection 
organization (kf). Moreover, Economiesuisse and Suissedigital worried that transparency requirements 
would hinder innovation. 
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Table 5. Arguments For and Against Transparency Obligation During Public Consultation. 
Arguments  Actors 
Against transparency obligation No need for regulation, as there 
is no market failure 
Economiesuisse, SGV 
asut, Suissedigital (and 
members), Glasfasernetz 
Schweiz 
TSP (Swisscom) 
 Self-regulation sufficient CVP, BDP 
Economiesuisse 
asut, Suissedigital (and 
members), Glasfasernetz 
Schweiz 
TSPs (Salt, Swisscom, UPC) 
kf 
various actors 
 Impediment to innovation Economiesuisse 
Suissedigital (and members) 
 High costs TSPs (Quickline, Salt) 
 Competition law sufficient TSP (Salt) 
No position  ICT Switzerland 
For transparency obligation Self-regulation not sufficient PP 
Federal Media Commission 
openaxs, VSP 
Microsoft 
SKS, FRC, ACSI 
NGOs 
 Provide consumers with 
information 
FDP, SP 
Price Regulator 
TSPs (Sunrise, VTX), Microsoft 
Various actors 
 Impediment to innovation and 
market entry 
GLP 
 Low costs Microsoft 
 Consumer protection SKS, FRC, ACSI 
Various actors 
Note. Documents analyzed: BAKOM (2016); UVEK (2016). 
 
Conversely, several actors emphasized that self-regulation was insufficient. These included various 
civil-society organizations committed to an “open Internet” (nearly identical statements by associations such 
as /ch/open, Verein Digitale Gesellschaft, and ISOC-CH, hereafter called NGOs), the Federal Media 
Commission, the trade associations of private radio stations (VSP), and electricity companies for the 
promotion of open broadband networks (openaxs), the main consumer protection organizations (SKS, FRC, 
ACSI), the Pirate Party (PP), and Microsoft. In addition, the Price Regulator, the Social-Democratic Party 
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(SP), and the Liberal Party (FDP), some (tele-)communications service providers, and Microsoft argued that 
transparency was needed to provide consumers with sufficient information. It was also argued that a 
transparency obligation was needed to allow for innovation (Green Liberal Party GLP), protect consumers 
(consumer protection organizations SKS, FRC, ACSI), and would be inexpensive for telecommunications 
companies (Microsoft). 
 
Actors also raised the issue of whether statutory regulation beyond transparency requirements was 
needed to guarantee net neutrality (see Table 6).  
 
Table 6. Arguments For and Against Stricter Regulation During Public Consultation. 
Arguments  Actors 
Against regulation No need for regulation, as there 
is no market failure 
BDP 
TSP (Swisscom) 
various actors 
 Transparency obligation is 
sufficient 
FDP 
Suissedigital (and members) 
TSPs (Salt, VTX) 
various actors 
 Impediment to innovation BDP 
SGV 
 No incentive for investment in 
infrastructure 
SGV 
 Favors global companies TSP (VTX) 
No position  ICT Switzerland 
For regulation Discrimination against third-
party services 
SGB 
RRR, TeleSuisse, VSP 
Broadcasters (3+, AZ, SRG), 
Microsoft 
NGOs 
 Impediment to innovation and 
market entry 
SP, GLP 
openaxs, RRR, TeleSuisse, VSP 
Broadcasters (3+, AZ, SRG), 
Microsoft 
NGOs 
 Transparency not sufficient GLP, GP, SPS, PP 
Federal Media Commission 
SGB 
RRR, TeleSuisse, VSP 
Broadcasters (3+, AZ, SRG), 
Microsoft 
SKS, FRC, ACSI 
NGOs 
various actors 
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 Self-regulation not sufficient PP 
Federal Media Commission 
openaxs, VSP 
Microsoft 
SKS, FRC, ACSI 
NGOs 
 Market failure and abuse by 
TSPs 
GLP 
RRR, TeleSuisse, VSP 
Broadcasters (3+, AZ, SRG), 
Microsoft 
NGOs 
 Traffic management remains 
possible 
SP 
Microsoft 
NGOs 
 Consumer protection SP 
RRR, TeleSuisse, VSP 
Broadcasters (3+, AZ, SRG), 
Microsoft 
SKS, FRC, ACSI 
NGOs 
 The Internet as a basic 
infrastructure for society 
SP 
SGB 
Microsoft, TSP (Init7) 
 Media diversity Federal Media Commission 
RRR, TeleSuisse, VSP 
Broadcasters (3+, AZ, SRG) 
WikimediaCH 
 Adapt to EU regulation Microsoft 
various actors 
 Freedom of information and 
expression 
SP 
RRR, TeleSuisse, VSP 
Broadcasters (3+, AZ, SRG) 
WikimediaCH 
Note. Documents analyzed: BAKOM (2016); UVEK (2016). 
 
Generally, actors that opposed the transparency obligation also rejected stricter regulation. Yet some of the 
actors who supported transparency also voiced their opposition to enshrining net neutrality in law. They 
argued that additional regulation was unnecessary (Swisscom, center-right party BDP) or that transparency 
requirements go far enough (Suissedigital and many of its members, TSPs, Liberal Party FDP). Additional 
arguments against regulation were obstacles to innovation (SGV, BDP) and to investment in infrastructure 
(SGV). 
 
International Journal of Communication 13(2019)  Parliament Against Government  5855 
Conversely, a broad coalition of actors ranging from center-left parties and unions to media companies 
supported the inclusion of the net neutrality principle in the new TCA. Several actors argued that a transparency 
requirement was not enough—namely, the major public and private broadcasters and their trade associations 
(joint statement by SRG, 3+, AZ Medien, Goldbach, RRR, TeleSuisse, VSP), center-left parties (SP, GP, GLP, 
PP), the federation of trade unions (SGB), the main consumer protection organizations (SKS, FRC, ACSI), the 
Federal Media Commission, civil society organizations committed to an “open Internet” (NGOs), and Microsoft. 
They advocated regulation both on economic and social grounds. Economic arguments included consumer 
protection (NGOs, consumer protection organizations, broadcasters, Microsoft), obstacles to innovation and 
market entry (NGOs, center-left parties SP and GLP, broadcasters, Microsoft, openaxs), the need to prevent 
discrimination against third-party online services (NGOs, broadcasters, SGB, Microsoft), as well as market 
failure (NGOs, GLP, broadcasters, Microsoft). In addition, few actors also called for regulation referring to social 
objectives such as media diversity (Federal Media Commission, broadcasters, WikimediaCH), freedom of 
information and expression (SP, broadcasters, WikimediaCH), and preserving the Internet as a basic 
infrastructure (SGB, SP, Microsoft). Interestingly, only a few actors noted that the EU had also passed a net 
neutrality regulation and argued that Switzerland should adapt to these rules. 
 
Parliamentary Phase of Policy Formulation 
 
Once the public consultation ended, the government decided to refrain from stronger regulation 
and sent the bill to parliament basically unchanged, at least with respect to net neutrality. Articles 12a (2) 
and (3) of the 2017 TCA draft (Telecommunications Act Draft 2017) still contained the same requirements 
for telecommunications service providers to inform the public if they were treating information differently 
during transmission and to inform about the quality of service. Given the contradictory feedback about net 
neutrality regulation, the government regarded its original proposition as a working compromise (Federal 
Council, 2017, p. 6601). 
 
However, in parliament, the draft bill underwent some decisive changes. A majority of the select 
committee for transport and telecommunications of the National Council (TTC-N) suddenly proposed 
stronger regulation in a new Article 12e dedicated to the “open Internet” (TTC-N, 2018, authors’ translation): 
 
Article 12e “Open Internet” 
(1) Internet access service providers transmit information without distinguishing either 
technically or economically between senders, receivers, content, services, service classes, 
protocols, applications, programs, or terminal equipment used. 
(2) They may transmit information differently if this is necessary to 
a. comply with legal provisions or a court decision; 
b. preserve the integrity or security of the network, of services provided via that network, 
or of the connected terminal equipment; 
c. fulfill the explicit request of customers; or 
d. combat temporary and exceptional network congestion, provided that equivalent kinds 
of data traffic are treated equally. 
(3) If they treat information technically or economically differently during transmission, 
they have to publicly inform their customers. 
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In autumn 2018, the proposal won a majority in the National Council despite government opposition 
(Official Bulletin of the National Council AB N, 2018, pp. 1691–1709, 1711–1726). In the parliamentary 
debate, no one put forward any arguments against the transparency obligation proposed by the 
government—despite the strong opposition during the public consultation (see Table 7; for a list of actors, 
see Table A1 in the Appendix). 
 
 
Table 7. Arguments For and Against Transparency Obligation in Parliament. 
Arguments  Actors 
Against transparency obligation – – 
For transparency obligation Provide consumers with 
information 
Federal Council 
Note. Document analyzed: Official Bulletin of the National Council AB N (2018). 
 
 
An even greater surprise than the absence of opposition to transparency requirements was that 
an overwhelming majority followed the select committee and voted in favor of the newly proposed 
regulation (182 votes in favor, five against). MPs across the political spectrum argued that transparency 
requirements and self-regulation were insufficient to guarantee net neutrality. Rather, reinforcing the 
principle in law was deemed necessary to prevent discrimination against third-party services, protect 
consumers, safeguard innovation and market entry, as well as to preserve an “open Internet” as a basic 
infrastructure for society. In contrast to the public consultation, the government was alone in arguing 
that stricter regulation could hinder innovation and was unnecessary because of a lack of market failure, 
the existence of competition law, self-regulation, and the proposed transparency obligation (see Table 
8). Its representative claimed that such transparency would provide sufficient information for “customers 
to vote with their feet and change their Internet access provider” (Federal Councilor Doris Leuthard, 
Official Bulletin of the National Council AB N, 2018, p. 1714). 
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Table 8. Arguments For and Against Stricter Regulation in Parliament. 
Arguments  Actors 
Against regulation No need for regulation, as there 
is no market failure 
Federal Council 
 Transparency obligation is 
sufficient 
Federal Council 
 Restricts economic 
freedom/impediment to 
innovation/self-regulation 
sufficient/reverse 
discrimination/competition law 
sufficient 
Federal Council 
No position  Hiltpold/FDP 
For regulation Discrimination against third-
party services 
Grossen/GLP 
 Impediment to innovation and 
market entry 
Töngi/GP; Ammann/CVP; 
Grossen/GLP 
 Transparency not sufficient TTC-N; Burkart/FDP; Rickli/SVP 
 Self-regulation not sufficient Rickli/SVP 
 Market failure and abuse by 
TSPs 
Rickli/SVP 
 Traffic management remains 
possible 
Aebischer/SP 
 Consumer protection Ammann/CVP; Rickli/SVP; 
Aebischer/SP; Grossen/GLP 
 The Internet as a basic 
infrastructure for society 
TTC-N; Hardegger/SP; 
Töngi/GP; Grossen/GLP; 
Aebischer/SP 
 Provide consumers with 
information 
Hurter/SVP; Rickli/SVP; 
Grossen/GLP 
Note. Documents analyzed: Official Bulletin of the National Council AB N (2018); Official Bulletin of the 
Council of States AB S (2018). 
 
The Council of States’ select committee for transport and telecommunications (TTC-S) was more 
reluctant about the newly proposed article and unanimously suggested amending the National Council’s 
formulation with an exemption for specialized services (TTC-S, 2018, authors’ translation): 
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Article 12e “Open Internet” 
(2bis) In addition to Internet access services, they [the providers of Internet access 
services] may offer other services using the same connection that do not offer access to 
the Internet and that are optimized for specific content, applications, or services if 
a. the optimization is necessary to meet quality requirements of customers for such 
content, applications, or services; 
b. the network capacity is sufficient to provide these services in addition to Internet access 
services provided; 
c. the other services are not usable or offered as a replacement for Internet access 
services; 
d. the other services are not to the detriment of the availability or general quality of 
Internet access services for end users. 
 
The plenary debate in the Council of States only briefly touched on net neutrality and did not 
fundamentally question the need for regulation (Official Bulletin of the Council of States AB S, 2018, pp. 
822–840). The debate focused entirely on the exemption for specialized services, and nobody argued 
against it (see Table 9).  
 
Table 9. Arguments For and Against Exemption for Specialized Services in Parliament. 
Arguments  Actors 
Against exemption – – 
For exemption Flexibility and innovation TTC-S  
 Guarantee minimum quality of 
specialized services 
TTC-S, Federal Council  
 Compatibility with EU regulation TTC-S, Federal Council  
Note. Document analyzed: Official Bulletin of the Council of States AB S (2018). 
 
MPs followed their select committee and voted in favor of such an exemption to guarantee the 
quality of specialized services (e.g., IPTV, self-driving cars, emergency services), allow for flexibility and 
innovation (especially in light of the upcoming 5G standard), and establish compatibility with EU 
regulations. Indeed, the amendment leads to an alignment with some EU rules (“Regulation [EU] 
2015/2120,” 2015, Art. 3). Altogether, the EU regulation is substantially longer, containing specifics about 
network management practices (e.g., no monitoring of specific content; no commercial interest, but 
technical necessity; personal data processing), but the Swiss counterpart is inspired by it and shares 
substantive ideas, especially about specialized services. Although the government still did not see the 
need for regulation beyond transparency requirements, it accepted a solution that would avoid adopting 
a stricter regulation than the EU’s: 
 
The principle of equality adopted by the National Council is hard regulation . . . . It would 
go beyond EU regulation . . . . The provision designed by your committee is at least 
compatible with the EU. It is still regulation for an area where there is no problem. . . . 
But we can live with that. (Federal Councilor Doris Leuthard, Official Bulletin of the Council 
of States AB S, 2018, p. 831, authors’ translation) 
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In the second reading of the bill, the National Council’s select committee decided to support the 
exemption for specialized services. However, it proposed a more simplified provision than was suggested 
by the federal administration (BAKOM, 2019; TTC-N, 2019, authors’ translation): 
 
Article 12e “Open Internet” 
(3) In addition to Internet access services, they [the providers of Internet access services] 
may offer other services using the same connection that have to be optimized for specific 
content, applications, or services to meet quality requirements of customers. The other 
services may not be usable or offered as a replacement for Internet access services, and 
they may not be to the detriment of the quality of Internet access services. 
 
Both chambers of parliament voted in favor of this simplified formulation and adopted the revised 
TCA in March 2019 (Official Bulletin of the National Council AB N, 2019; Official Bulletin of the Council of 
States AB S, 2019). Because nobody called a referendum, the revised act including net neutrality regulation 
is projected to enter into force in 2020. 
 
Discussion and Conclusion 
 
Net neutrality has become a fiercely debated issue because of concerns that ISPs might block, 
prioritize, or throttle Internet traffic. This article’s aim was to shed more light on how policies are developed 
and to analyze the arguments employed by the actors involved to advocate or prevent specific regulatory 
solutions for net neutrality in Switzerland. 
 
Regarding the outcome of policymaking, the Swiss parliament opted to stipulate net neutrality by 
law against the will of the telecommunications industry (which advocated self-regulation) and the 
government (which favored a transparency obligation). This outcome is rather surprising, given that there 
are various institutional characteristics of the political decision-making process (e.g., prospective 
referendum) as well as Switzerland’s traditional aversion to regulation and its trust in private-sector 
solutions that would have indicated otherwise. 
 
Focusing on the actors involved in policymaking and their arguments, it becomes evident that the two 
opposing camps often discussed in research (CAPs and NGOs for regulation, and ISPs against regulation) are 
only identifiable during early stages of the policy process. The strong relationship between the net neutrality 
debate and partisan politics found in the U.S. (Faris et al., 2016; Hart, 2011) cannot be confirmed in the Swiss 
case. After an initial split along party lines, parliamentary debates showed agreement across the political 
spectrum. However, in line with previous research (Cheng et al., 2012; Hart, 2011), both camps employed 
economic arguments that emphasize competition, property rights, investment, and innovation. Proponents of 
regulation also used sociopolitical arguments (e.g., freedom of information, the Internet as a basic infrastructure, 
media diversity), but these were less prevalent and mainly voiced by left-wing parties, unions, and broadcasters. 
 
To understand why proponents of net neutrality ultimately succeeded and why parliament opted 
for regulation is more difficult. As select committee meetings are confidential, the negotiations and 
interactions in committees remain a black box for researchers until minutes become available for research 
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or the participants agree to share insights. If at all, this usually happens only after the law has been 
implemented. At that point, interviews may be a good option to shed more light on this issue. 
 
For now, there are only theoretical explanations. An obvious answer would be policy diffusion and 
compatibility with EU regulations. Though not obligated to adopt EU law, Switzerland often unilaterally 
adapts to it. However, EU compatibility was a rare argument in the debate. 
 
Political dynamics in negotiations seem to offer a more powerful explanation. Net neutrality was only 
one of many issues discussed during the TCA revision, and horse-trading was presumably a necessity. Agreeing 
to net neutrality regulation may have been considered less fraught with consequences than, for example, 
agreeing to complete last-mile unbundling—a proposal that was eventually dropped. The generic exemption 
for specialized services, the permission to differentiate upon customers’ explicit request, and the de facto 
impossibility of ultimately verifying whether traffic management happens in violation of such rules point to 
eventually limited effects for ISPs. So far, few complaints have been filed with the self-regulatory arbitration 
board, which recently announced it was terminating its activity because of lack of demand and the newly 
adopted law. It is unlikely that more complaints will arise after the law comes into force. The exemption for 
specialized services may also have made it feasible for parliamentarians from across the political spectrum to 
agree to regulation, even more so as no unified business interests existed. Furthermore, the term “net 
neutrality” has evolved in a way that allows for subsuming very different policy objectives under it. 
 
It is unclear whether net neutrality regulation will be effective in realizing policy objectives as varied 
as competition, innovation, media diversity, or freedom of expression. It is also uncertain whether net 
neutrality is really an adequate principle for the future development of the Internet and a satisfactory means 
for all the facets it seeks to address. In this vein, evaluating the impact, enforcement, and supervision of 
net neutrality regulation will require more scholarly attention in the future. 
 
 
References 
 
Anderson, J. A. (1975). Public policy-making. New York, NY: Praeger. 
 
Audibert, L. C., & Murray, A. D. (2016). A principled approach to network neutrality. SCRIPTed, 13(2), 
118–143. doi:10.2966/scrip.130216.118 
 
Baake, P., & Sudaric, S. (2018). Netzneutralität: Priorisierungen sind aus ökonomischer Sicht sinnvoll [Net 
neutrality: Prioritization reasonable from an economic perspective]. DIW Wochenbericht, 85(22), 
554–559. doi:10.18723/diw_wb:2018-25-4 
 
BAKOM. (2014). Netzneutralität. Bericht zur Arbeitsgruppe [Net neutrality: Report of the working group]. 
Retrieved from https://www.bakom.admin.ch/dam/bakom/de/dokumente/ 
netzneutralitaetberichtzurarbeitsgruppe.pdf  
 
International Journal of Communication 13(2019)  Parliament Against Government  5861 
BAKOM. (2016). Vernehmlassung zur Revision des FMG: Zusammenfassung der Ergebnisse und 
Stellungnahmen [Public consultation on TCA revision: Summary of results and written 
statements]. Retrieved from https://www.bakom.admin.ch/bakom/de/home/das-bakom/ 
organisation/rechtliche-grundlagen/vernehmlassungen/vernehmlassung-zur-revision-des-
fmg.html  
 
BAKOM. (2019). Netzneutralität inkl. Spezialdienste. Bericht an die KVF-N [Net neutrality incl. special 
services: Report to CTT-N]. Retrieved from https://www.parlament.ch/centers/documents/de/ 
kvf-n-17-058-netzneutralitaet-spezialdienste-d.pdf  
 
Bannerman, S., & Haggart, B. (2015). Historical institutionalism in communication studies. 
Communication Theory, 25(1), 1–22. doi:10.1111/comt.12051 
 
Bauer, J. M., & Knieps, G. (2018). Complementary innovation and network neutrality. Telecommunications 
Policy, 42(2), 172–183. doi:10.1016/j.telpol.2017.11.006 
 
Bauer, J. M., & Obar, J. A. (2014). Reconciling political and economic goals in the net neutrality debate. 
The Information Society, 30(1), 1–19. doi:10.1080/01972243.2013.856362 
 
Belli, L., & De Filippi, P. (Eds.). (2016). The net neutrality compendium. New York, NY: Springer. 
 
Cheng, A., Fleischmann, K. R., Wang, P., Ishita, E., & Oard, D. W. (2012). The role of innovation and 
wealth in the net neutrality debate: A content analysis of human values in congressional and FCC 
hearings. Journal of the American Society for Information Science and Technology, 63(7), 1360–
1373. doi:10.1002/asi.22646 
 
Cherry, B. A. (2007). Analyzing the network neutrality debate through awareness of agenda denial. 
International Journal of Communication, 1, 580–594. 
 
Code of Conduct Net Neutrality. (2017, April). Retrieved from http://www.ssnn.ch/view/data/3788/ 
Verhaltenskodex/170403_Verhaltensrichtlinien_April%202017.pdf  
 
Dischinger, M., Marcon, M., Guha, S., Gummadi, K. P., Mahajan, R., & Saroiu, S. (2010). Glasnost: 
Enabling end users to detect traffic differentiation. Retrieved from 
https://ratul.org/papers/nsdi2010-glasnost.pdf  
 
Easley, R. F., Guo, H., & Krämer, J. (2018). Research commentary—From net neutrality to data neutrality: 
A techno-economic framework and research agenda. Information Systems Research, 29(2),  
253–272. doi:10.1287/isre.2017.0740 
 
Faris, R., Roberts, H., Etling, B., Othman, D., & Benkler, Y. (2016). The role of the networked public 
sphere in the U.S. net neutrality policy debate. International Journal of Communication, 10, 
5839–5864. 
5862  Natascha Just and Manuel Puppis International Journal of Communication 13(2019) 
 
Faulhaber, G. R. (2011). Economics of net neutrality: A review. Communications & Convergence Review, 
3(1), 7–25. 
 
Federal Council. (2010). Evaluation zum Fernmeldemarkt [Evaluation of the telecommunications market]. 
Retrieved from https://www.bakom.admin.ch/dam/bakom/de/dokumente/tc/gesetzgebung/ 
evaluation_zum_fernmeldemarkt.pdf  
 
Federal Council. (2012). Evaluation zum Fernmeldemarkt. Ergänzungsbericht [Evaluation of the 
telecommunications market: Additional report]. Retrieved from https://www.bakom.admin.ch/ 
dam/bakom/de/dokumente/tc/publikationen/evaluation_zum_fernmeldemarkt.pdf  
 
Federal Council. (2014). Fernmeldebericht 2014 zur Entwicklung im schweizerischen Fernmeldemarkt 
[Telecommunications report 2014 on the development of the Swiss telecommunications market]. 
Retrieved from https://www.bakom.admin.ch/dam/bakom/de/dokumente/2014/11/ 
fernmeldebericht2014.pdf  
 
Federal Council. (2017). Botschaft zur Revision des Fernmeldegesetzes [Dispatch regarding the revision of 
the Telecommunications Act]. Retrieved from https://www.admin.ch/opc/de/federal-gazette/ 
2017/6559.pdf  
 
Friedlander, S. A. (2016). Net neutrality and the FCC’s 2015 Open Internet Order. Berkeley Technology 
Law Journal, 31(2), 905–929. doi:10.15779/Z382S0F 
 
Gerlach, J. (2016). The informational ecosystem of net neutrality. Retrieved from 
https://www1.unisg.ch/www/edis.nsf/SysLkpByIdentifier/4402/$FILE/dis4402.pdf  
 
Hall, P. A., & Taylor, R. C. R. (1996). Political science and the three new institutionalisms. Political Studies, 
44(5), 936–957. doi:10.1111/j.1467-9248.1996.tb00343.x 
 
Hart, J. A. (2011). The net neutrality debate in the United States. Journal of Information Technology & 
Politics, 8(4), 418–443. doi:10.1080/19331681.2011.577650 
 
Hartman, T. K. (2012). Toll booths on the information superhighway? Policy metaphors in the case of net 
neutrality. Political Communication, 29(3), 278–298. doi:10.1080/10584609.2012.694983 
 
Herman, B. D., & Kim, M. (2014). The Internet defends itself: The network neutrality debate on the Web. 
The Information Society, 30(1), 31–44. doi:10.1080/01972243.2013.855687 
 
Immergut, E. M. (1992). The rules of the game: The logic of health policy-making in France, Switzerland, 
and Sweden. In F. Longstreth, K. Thelen, & S. Steinmo (Eds.), Structuring politics (pp. 57–89). 
Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press. 
 
International Journal of Communication 13(2019)  Parliament Against Government  5863 
Jann, W., & Wegrich, K. (2007). Theories of the policy cycle. In F. Fischer, G. J. Miller, & M. S. Sidney 
(Eds.), Handbook of public policy analysis (pp. 43–62). Boca Raton, FL: CRC. 
 
Julien, H. (2008). Content analysis. In L. M. Given (Ed.), The SAGE encyclopedia of qualitative research 
methods (pp. 120–122). Los Angeles, CA: SAGE Publications. 
 
Karppinen, K., & Moe, H. (2019). Texts as data I: Document analysis. In H. Van den Bulck, M. Puppis, K. 
Donders, & L. Van Audenhove (Eds.), The Palgrave handbook of methods for media policy 
research (pp. 249–262). Cham, Switzerland: Palgrave Macmillan. 
 
Kim, M., Chung, C. J., & Kim, J. H. (2011). Who shapes network neutrality policy debate? 
Telecommunications Policy, 35(4), 314–324. doi:10.1016/j.telpol.2011.02.005 
 
Kimball, D. (2013). What we talk about when we talk about net neutrality: A historical genealogy of the 
discourse of “net neutrality.” In Z. Stiegler (Ed.), Regulating the Web (pp. 33–48). Lanham, MD: 
Lexington Books. 
 
Kimball, D. (2016). Wonkish populism in media advocacy and net neutrality policy making. International 
Journal of Communication, 10, 5949–5968. 
 
Kracauer, S. (1952). The challenge of qualitative content analysis. Public Opinion Quarterly, 16(4), 631–
641. doi:10.1086/266427 
 
Krämer, J., Wiewiorra, L., & Weinhardt, C. (2013). Net neutrality: A progress report. Telecommunications 
Policy, 37(9), 794–813. doi:10.2139/ssrn.2344623 
 
Kuckartz, U. (2014). Qualitative Inhaltsanalyse [Qualitative content analysis]. Weinheim, Germany: Beltz. 
 
Lasswell, H. D. (1956). The decision process. College Park, MD: University of Maryland Press. 
 
Latzer, M. (2013). Towards an innovation-co-evolution-complexity perspective on communications policy. 
In M. Löblich & S. Pfaff-Rüdiger (Eds.), Communication and media policy in the era of digitization 
and the Internet (pp. 15–27). Baden-Baden, Germany: Nomos. 
 
Latzer, M., Just, N., Saurwein, F., & Slominski, P. (2003). Regulation remixed: Institutional change 
through self- and co-regulation in the mediamatics sector. Communications and Strategies, 
50(2), 127–157. 
 
Latzer, M., Saurwein, F., & Just, N. (2019). Assessing policy II: Governance-choice method. In H. Van den 
Bulck, M. Puppis, K. Donders, & L. Van Audenhove (Eds.), The Palgrave handbook of methods for 
media policy research (pp. 557–574). Cham, Switzerland: Palgrave Macmillan. 
 
5864  Natascha Just and Manuel Puppis International Journal of Communication 13(2019) 
Lee, K. S., Sang, Y., & Xu, W. W. (2015). The shaping of the network neutrality debate: Information 
subsidizers on Twitter. International Journal of Communication, 9, 1544–1562. 
 
Lehmbruch, G. (1993). Consociational democracy and corporatism in Switzerland. Publius, 23(2), 43–60. 
doi:10.2307/3330858 
 
Lentz, B. (2013). Excavating historicity in the U.S. network neutrality debate: An interpretive perspective 
on policy change. Communication, Culture & Critique, 6(4), 568–597. doi:10.1111/cccr.12033 
 
Lijphart, A. (1989). Democratic political systems: Types, cases, causes, and consequences. Journal of 
Theoretical Politics, 1(1), 33–48. doi:10.1177/0951692889001001003 
 
Lijphart, A. (1999). Patterns of democracy. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press. 
 
Löblich, M. (2016). Dissent and political participation: The many faces of communication policy advocacy 
and activism. Communication, Culture & Critique, 9(3), 395–416. doi:10.1111/cccr.12113 
 
Löblich, M., & Musiani, F. (2014). Net neutrality and communication research: The implications of Internet 
infrastructure for the public sphere. Annals of the International Communication Association, 
38(1), 339–367. doi:10.1080/23808985.2014.11679167 
 
Ly, A., MacDonald, B. H., & Toze, S. (2012). Understanding the net neutrality debate: Listening to 
stakeholders. First Monday, 17(5). doi:10.5210/fm.v17i5.3857 
 
Mach, A., & Trampusch, C. (2011). The Swiss political economy in comparative perspective. In  
C. Trampusch & A. Mach (Eds.), Switzerland in Europe (pp. 11–26). London, UK: Routledge. 
 
Maltinsky, A., Giladi, R., & Shavitt, Y. (2017). On network neutrality measurements. ACM Transactions on 
Intelligent Systems and Technology, 8(4), 1–22. doi:10.1145/3040966 
 
Marsden, C. T. (2016). Comparative case studies in implementing net neutrality: A critical analysis of zero 
rating. SCRIPTed, 13(1), 1–39. doi:10.2966/scrip.130116.1 
 
Marsden, C. T. (2017). Network neutrality. Manchester, UK: Manchester University Press. 
 
Mayring, P. (2015). Qualitative Inhaltsanalyse [Qualitative content analysis]. Weinheim, Germany: Beltz. 
 
Milosavljević, M., Poler, M., & Kerševan Smokvina, T. (2019). Net neutrality in a “peripheral” but 
pioneering country: Policy processes, consequences, and developments in Slovenia. Medijska 
Istraživanja, 25(1), 33–53. doi:10.22572/mi.25.1.2 
 
Motion 12.4212. (2012). Fernmeldegesetz [Telecommunications act]. Retrieved from 
https://www.parlament.ch/de/ratsbetrieb/suche-curia-vista/geschaeft?AffairId=20124212  
International Journal of Communication 13(2019)  Parliament Against Government  5865 
 
Neute, N. (2016). Innovationswirkung der Netzneutralität [Innovation effect of net neutrality]. Ilmenau, 
Germany: Universitätsverlag Ilmenau. 
 
Official Bulletin of the Council of States AB S (2015). Spring Session 2015. Retrieved from 
https://www.parlament.ch/centers/documents/de/SR_4917_1503.pdf  
 
Official Bulletin of the Council of States AB S (2018). Winter Session 2018. Retrieved from 
https://www.parlament.ch/centers/documents/de/SR_5015_1812.pdf  
 
Official Bulletin of the Council of States AB S (2019). Spring Session 2019. Retrieved from 
https://www.parlament.ch/centers/documents/de/SR_5016_1903.pdf  
 
Official Bulletin of the National Council AB N (2014). Summer Session 2014. Retrieved from 
https://www.parlament.ch/centers/documents/de/NR_4914_1406.pdf  
 
Official Bulletin of the National Council AB N (2018). Autumn Session 2018. Retrieved from 
https://www.parlament.ch/centers/documents/de/NR_5014_1809.pdf  
 
Official Bulletin of the National Council AB N (2019). Spring Session 2019. Retrieved from 
https://www.parlament.ch/centers/documents/de/NR_5016_1903.pdf  
 
Papadopoulos, Y. (2001). How does direct democracy matter? The impact of referendum votes on politics 
and policymaking. West European Politics, 24(2), 35–58. doi:10.1080/01402380108425432 
 
Papadopoulos, Y. (2008). Europeanization? Two logics of change of policy-making patterns in Switzerland. 
Journal of Comparative Policy Analysis: Research and Practice, 10(3), 255–278. 
doi:10.1080/13876980802231107 
 
Pasquale, F. (2016). Platform neutrality: Enhancing freedom of expression in spheres of private power. 
Theoretical Inquiries in Law, 17(2), 487–513. doi:10.1515/til-2016-0018 
 
Powell, A., & Cooper, A. (2011). Net neutrality discourses: Comparing advocacy and regulatory arguments 
in the United States and the United Kingdom. The Information Society, 27(5), 311–325. 
doi:10.1080/01972243.2011.607034 
 
Puppis, M. (2010). Media governance: A new concept for the analysis of media policy and regulation. 
Communication, Culture & Critique, 3(2), 134–149. doi:10.1111/j.1753-9137.2010.01063.x 
 
Puppis, M. (2019). Analyzing talk and text I: Qualitative content analysis. In H. Van den Bulck, M. Puppis, 
K. Donders, & L. Van Audenhove (Eds.), The Palgrave handbook of methods for media policy 
research (pp. 367–384). Cham, Switzerland: Palgrave Macmillan. 
 
5866  Natascha Just and Manuel Puppis International Journal of Communication 13(2019) 
Regulation (EU) 2015/2120 of the European Parliament and of the Council. (2015, November 25). 
Retrieved from https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:32015R2120  
 
Reh, W. (1995). Quellen- und Dokumentenanalyse in der Politikfeldforschung [Source and document 
analysis in policy research]. In U. von Alemann (Ed.), Politikwissenschaftliche Methoden [Methods 
of political science] (pp. 201–259). Opladen, Germany: Westdeutscher Verlag. 
 
Renda, A. (2008). I own the pipe, you call the tune: The net neutrality debate and its (ir)relevance for 
Europe. Retrieved from https://ssrn.com/abstract=1291027  
 
Renda, A. (2015). Antitrust, regulation and the neutrality trap: A plea for a smart, evidence-based 
internet policy. Retrieved from https://www.ceps.eu/system/files/SR104_AR_NetNeutrality.pdf 
 
Sabatier, P. A. (2008). The need for better theories. In P. A. Sabatier (Ed.), Theories of the policy process 
(pp. 3–17). Boulder, CO: Westview. 
 
Schreier, M. (2014). Qualitative content analysis. In U. Flick (Ed.), The SAGE handbook of qualitative data 
analysis (pp. 170–183). London, UK: SAGE Publications. 
 
Schultze, S. J., & Whitt, R. S. (2016). The Internet as a complex layered system. In J. M. Bauer &  
M. Latzer (Eds.), Handbook on the economics of the Internet (pp. 55–71). Cheltenham, UK: 
Elgar. 
 
Sciarini, P. (2007). The decision-making process. In U. Klöti, P. Knoepfel, H. Kriesi, W. Linder,  
Y. Papadopoulos, & P. Sciarini (Eds.), Handbook of Swiss politics (pp. 465–499). Zürich, 
Switzerland: NZZ Libro. 
 
Scott, J. (1990). A matter of record. Cambridge, UK: Polity. 
 
Shin, D.-H. (2014). A comparative analysis of net neutrality: Insights gained by juxtaposing the U.S. and 
Korea. Telecommunications Policy, 38(11), 1117–1133. doi:10.1016/j.telpol.2014.09.010 
 
Sluijs, J. P. (2012). From competition to freedom of expression: Introducing Article 10 ECHR in the 
European network neutrality debate. Human Rights Law Review, 12(3), 509–554. 
doi:10.2139/ssrn.1927814 
 
Stiegler, Z., & Sprumont, D. (2013). Framing the net neutrality debate. In Z. Stiegler (Ed.), Regulating 
the Web (pp. 123–142). Lanham, MD: Lexington Books. 
 
Telecommunications Act 1997 (amended 2007). Retrieved from https://www.admin.ch/opc/de/classified-
compilation/19970160/200704010000/784.10.pdf  
 
International Journal of Communication 13(2019)  Parliament Against Government  5867 
Telecommunications Act Draft 2017. Retrieved from https://www.admin.ch/opc/de/federal-
gazette/2017/6705.pdf  
 
Telecommunications Act Pre-Draft 2015. Retrieved from https://www.bakom.admin.ch/dam/bakom/de/ 
dokumente/2015/12/teilrevision_desfernmeldegesetzesfmg.pdf  
 
TTC-N. (2018). Anträge der KVF-N, 28.08.2018 [Proposals of CTT-N]. Retrieved from 
https://www.parlament.ch/centers/eparl/curia/2017/20170058/N1%20D.pdf  
 
TTC-N. (2019). Anträge der KVF-N, 11.02.2019 [Proposals of CTT-N]. Retrieved from 
https://www.parlament.ch/centers/eparl/curia/2017/20170058/N3%20D.pdf  
 
TTC-S. (2018). Anträge der KVF-S, 12.11.2018 [Proposals of CTT-S]. Retrieved from 
https://www.parlament.ch/centers/eparl/curia/2017/20170058/S2%20D.pdf  
 
UVEK (2015). Erläuterungsbericht zur Änderung des Fernmeldegesetzes [Explanatory report to the 
revision of the telecommunications act]. Retrieved from https://www.bakom.admin.ch/dam/ 
bakom/de/dokumente/2015/12/erlaeuterungsberichtzuraenderungdesfernmeldegesetzes.pdf  
 
UVEK (2016). Teilrevision des Fernmeldegesetzes (FMG). Zusammenfassung der Ergebnisse des 
Vernehmlassungsverfahrens [Revision of the TCA: Summary of the consultation]. Retrieved from 
https://www.bakom.admin.ch/dam/bakom/de/dokumente/tc/Zusammenfassung%20der%20Erge
bnisse%20des%20Vernehmlassungsverfahrens/Zusammenfassung%20der%20Ergebnisse%20de
s%20Vernehmlassungsverfahrens.pdf  
 
van Schewick, B. (2010). Internet architecture and innovation. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. 
 
van Schewick, B. (2015). Network neutrality and quality of service: What a nondiscrimination rule should 
look like. Stanford Law Review, 67(1), 1–166. 
 
van Schewick, B. (2016). Internet architecture and innovation in applications. In J. M. Bauer & M. Latzer 
(Eds.), Handbook on the economics of the Internet (pp. 288–322). Cheltenham, UK: Elgar. 
 
Windhoff-Héritier, A. (1987). Policy-Analyse [Policy analysis]. Frankfurt, Germany: Campus. 
 
Wu, T. (2003). Network neutrality, broadband discrimination. Journal on Telecommunications and High 
Technology Law, 2(1), 141–176. 
 
Yoo, C. S. (2004). Would mandating network neutrality help or hurt broadband competition? A comment on 
the end-to-end debate. Journal on Telecommunications and High Technology Law, 3(1), 23–68. 
 
5868  Natascha Just and Manuel Puppis International Journal of Communication 13(2019) 
Yoo, C. S. (2013). Network neutrality and the need for a technological turn in Internet scholarship. In  
M. E. Price, S. G. Verhulst, & L. Morgan (Eds.), Routledge handbook of media law (pp. 539–555). 
New York, NY: Routledge. 
 
 
 
Appendix 
 
Table A1: List of Actors. 
Actor Description 
Parliament  
TTC-N Select committee for Transport and Telecommunications of the National 
Council 
TTC-S Select committee for Transport and Telecommunications of the Council of 
States 
Political parties  
BDP Conservative Democratic Party 
CVP Christian Democratic People’s Party 
FDP Liberal Party 
GLP Green Liberal Party 
GP Green Party 
PP Pirate Party 
SP Social Democratic Party 
SVP Swiss People’s Party 
Federal administration 
Federal Media 
Commission 
Independent advisory body on the media 
Price Regulator Authority monitoring price development in markets and eliminating 
abusive prices (increases or retention) 
Umbrella organizations 
Economiesuisse Federation of industries 
SGV Association of small and medium-sized businesses 
ICT Switzerland Organization representing the digital economy 
SGB Federation of trade unions 
Trade associations  
asut Telecommunications service providers 
Glasfasernetz Schweiz Fiber-optic providers 
openaxs Electricity companies for the promotion of open broadband networks 
Suissedigital Cable networks 
RRR French-language regional radio stations 
TeleSuisse Private TV stations 
VSP Private radio stations 
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Individual companies  
Broadcasting 3+ (commercial TV), AZ Medien (commercial TV), Goldbach (advertising 
marketer), SRG (public service broadcaster), 
Telecommunications Quickline, Salt, Sunrise, Swisscom (incumbent), UPC, VTX 
IT Microsoft 
Consumer protection organizations 
ACSI Main consumer protection organization (Italian) 
FRC Main consumer protection organization (French) 
kf Conservative consumer protection organization 
SKS Main consumer protection organization (German) 
Others  
/ch/open Association promoting open source and open standards 
Digitale Gesellschaft NGO advocating basic rights in digital society 
ISOC-CH Internet Society Switzerland Chapter 
WikimediaCH Swiss Chapter of Wikimedia Foundation 
 
 
 
Table A2: Actors with Joint or (Nearly) Identical Statements. 
Group Actors 
NGOs in favor of an open 
Internet 
(Nearly) identical statements by 10 actors, including NGOs, WikimediaCH, 
/ch/open, Internet Society Chapter Switzerland, Digitale Gesellschaft, and 
the Pirate Party 
Broadcasters Joint statement by the trade associations of private TV (TeleSuisse) and 
radio (VSP and RRR) as well as media organizations SRG (public service 
broadcaster), 3+ (commercial TV), AZ Medien (commercial TV), and 
Goldbach (advertising marketer) 
Cable TV and broadband 
providers 
(Nearly) identical statements by Suissedigital (trade association of cable 
networks) and 20 of its member organizations 
Consumer protection 
organizations 
Identical statements by SKS, FRC, and ACSI (main consumer protection 
organizations in the different language regions) 
 
